The non-English-speaking defendant in a criminal proceeding poses increasing problems for the administration of criminal justice. Minorities for whom English is not the principal language or who speak such unusual dialects of English as to cloud understanding and communication make up a discouraging proportion of offenders.' In areas of large ethnic enclaves where English is not the dominant tongue, officials have estimated that between thirty and forty per cent of criminal defendants require the aid of an interpreter fully to understand the proceedings against them. Thirty-five states make some statutory provision for appointment of interpreters in specified cases . 3 The Illinois statute is typical of one Rights 118, in Los Angeles (Aug. 17, 1968) . A number of states make generous provisions for deaf persons in criminal cases, but do not make any of the same provisions for those with language difficulty. E.g., W. VA. CODE §57-5-7 (1974 Supp.) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 17-137 k (West 1975) : "(a) In any criminal or civil action involving a deaf person, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to assist such person throughout such proceeding." The only other relevant Connecticut statute relates to compensation of interpreters. Nebraska expressly recognizes that appointment of an interpreter for the deaf is necessary to protect the constitutional right of the defendant to participate in the preparation and trial of his case, yet the constitutional rights of the nonEnglish speaking defendant are not considered. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-2401 to § 25-2406 (1975 Whenever any person accused of committing a felony or misdemeanor is to be tried in any court of this State, the court shall upon its own motion or that of the defense or prosecution determine whether the accused is capable of expressing himself in the English language so as to be understood directly by counsel, court or jury. If the court finds the accused incapable of so understanding or so expressing himself, the court shall appoint an interpreter for the accused whom he can understand and who can understand him. The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix the reasonable compensation of such interpreter. Such compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law or by the goverment, as the court may direct.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 28. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-241 (1956) ; DEL. CT. C.P.R. 28; HAW. REV. STAT. § 606.9 (1969) ; IND. R. TR 43 (F); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-17-7 (1972) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2301 .12 (Supp. 1974 . Most protective of the non-English-speaking defendant are statutes similar to Michigan's:
If any person is accused of any crime or misdemeanor and is about to be examined or tried before any justice of the peace, magistrate or judge or a court of record and it appears to the magistrate or judge that such person is incapable of adequately understanding the charge or presenting his defense thereto because of a lack of ability to understand or speak the English language or inability adequately to communicate by reason of being deaf and/or mute, or that such person suffers from a speech defect or other physical defect which handicaps such person in maintaining his rights in such cause, the justice of the peace, magistrate or judge shall appoint a qualified person to act as an interpreter. ... MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1256 (1) (1971) .
See also ARE. STAT. ANN. § 5-715 (1976); IOWA Standards for interpretation are almost nonexistent. Illinois requires the interpreter to swear "to truly interpret or translate all questions propounded or answers given as directed by the court." ' But if the interpreter is translating off-the-record for the benefit of the defendant, there is no check on the accuracy of the translation.
Almost nowhere is statutory provision made for interpreters at early stages after arrest. 6 In almost every jurisdiction, once criminal charges are lodged the judge is given broad latitude to decide whether to appoint an interpreter, while no regular procedures are prescribed for determining need. 7 Reviewing courts rarely question the trial judge's decision if there is any evidence at all of the defendant's ability to understand or speak some English, or if any translation has been provided. When an appeal is made on the basis of a constitutional claim that the defendant did not understand the proceedings or that they were inadequately translated to him, there is no record of what the defendant heard and understood to settle the very question raised for review.
This article examines the problems inherent in arresting, setting bail for, arraigning, accepting a plea from and trying a defendant whose ability to understand and express himself in The New Mexico Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to have the charge and testimony interpreted to him in a language he understands." N. M. CONST. art. 2, § 14. Certain West Texas border counties make provision for conducting the proceedings in Spanish with English interpreters. TEx English is minimal or non-existent. A critical examination of the Illinois statutes on interpreters and Illinois decisions on the constitutional questions raised by failure to provide an interpreter suggests that Illinois is far behind the federal courts and the courts of some other states in protecting the interests of linguistically handicapped criminal defendants. Yet in those courts in Cook County where a professional interpreter is regularly available, there is developing a judicial practice of calling upon the interpreter when there is any indication of need, even at an early stage in the proceedings. This is far more than is required by Illinois decisions and even beyond that practice suggested by various circuits of the United States Court of Appeals. Although concentrating particularly on the problems of the Spanish-speaking defendant, a member of the largest linguistic minority in Cook County, this article makes criticisms and recommendations that apply equally as well to the handling of the case of any non-English-speaking defendant.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The 1970 decennial census revealed that more than thirty-three million residents of the United States reported that their "mother tongue" was a language other than English." More than twenty-two million residents were either first generation or second generation immigrants of foreign-speaking parentage.
9
Puerto Ricans, who are considered "native," are not included in this figure. As the 1970 census is known to have ignored large numbers of urban poor, 0 and as the foreign-speaking are largely concentrated in the metropolitan areas of the country, the number for whom English is not the primary language could be much higher. L. REv. 1394 L. REv. , 1400 L. REv. (1973 .
16 GREBLER, supra note 12, at 424, Table 18-I. study of Spanish-speaking people in the southwest revealed that they averaged little more than eight years of education. When students left school, nearly three-fourths of them were below grade level. 18 Inadequately equipped by education and disabled by language from taking jobs outside of the Spanish-speaking community, they lost much of the English which they had learned, and became further isolated.
The large number of Spanish-speaking residents in Chicago and their high concentration in certain areas of that city suggest the same experience of linguistic isolation. and pushed past toward the principal's office, leading to a fight and an assault charge." 0 The Civil Rights Commission concluded after a series of hearings that the source of the trouble is often that the English-speaking policeman cannot comprehend the Spanish-speaker's intent from his speech.
3 ' The regular rise and fall of the Spanish intonation pattern, when accentuated by excitement, may be interpreted as a harangue. Thus, during a riot in East Los Angeles when police overheard a young Mexican attempting to quiet the crowd, they assumed that he was agitating it and arrested him. 32 Finally, misinterpretation of words similar to those ;n English can lead to miscomprehension and tragic consequences. When a mother complained to the police that her husband had drunkenly struck their daughter, the police took this to mean that the father was sexually molesting the child and arrested him. Understanding almost no English, the father did not object to the charge. The father remained in jail two months unable to make bail.
3 3 In Chicago, with a Spanish-speaking population of at least 9.4 per cent and a police force with fewer than 200 Spanish-speaking officers, 34 the potential for these misunderstandings is enormous.
More often, of course, arrest results not from misunderstanding but from probable cause. Once an arrest has been made, an interpreter may be necessary to warn the defendant of the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, and for effective questioning if those rights are waived. If the defendant speaks some English, it is almost impossible to show later that the warning was not understood or the waiver unknowing. Only Kansas requires appointment of (Dec. 5, 1975) . As of 1974, only one per cent of Chicago's police force was "Hispanic." During 1971-73, only twenty-three Hispanic officers were added to the police force. United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 548-49 (N.D. Il1. 1974) . At the City of Chicago Police Department, 14th District, located in a Latino neighborhood, there were only two Spanish-language officers as of June, 1974. Interview with Police Officer Durr, (July 9, 1974).
[Vol. 68 an interpreter at this time. 35 Arizona requires that upon the arrest of a deaf-mute, no interrogation of any kind shall take place prior to appointment of an interpreter and that there be a formal determination of the interpreter's competence. 36 But Arizona does not require comparable protection for the non-Englishspeaking defendant. No case in Illinois has held that the Illinois statute requires appointment of a language interpreter at the time bail is set for the defendant, although it could be argued that the determination of whether bail is excessive, in violation of the eighth amendment, cannot be made if the court is unable to communicate with the defendant. In People v. Macias, 3 s the defendant, who spoke no English, and her companions, were charged with aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon. Taken before the magistrate at 2:00 A.M., the defendant was unable to explain that she had no arrest record, had been regularly employed for four years, had lived at the same address for three years, and was the mother of a three-year-old child whom she had left with a babysitter when she went to work that evening. All these were factors which the Bail Reform Act of 1966'9 suggested would be proper ones to weigh when considering whether to grant bail and which might have affected the judgment of the court that night as to the bond required. But until May, 1975 A qualified interpreter shall be appointed in the following cases for persons whose primary language is one other than English, or who are deaf or mute or both:
(e) .... When such person is arrested for an alleged violation of a criminal law of the state or any city ordinance. Such appointment shall be made prior to any attempt to interrogate or take a statement from such persons. 36 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 12-242 B (Supp. 1976) . 37 In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Supreme Court held that bail set at an amount more than is reasonably necessary to assure the defendant's appearance at trial is excessive.
as No. 74-01764 (Cook County Criminal Court, 1974) . Macias remained in the Cook County House of Correction, Division 3, for more than three weeks without being provided an interpreter. Information obtained from the Nw. U. Legal Assistance Clinic (June, 1974) .
9 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1970) . 40 In May, 1975, at the urging of the Cook County
It also appears that no right to an interpreter at the preliminary hearing is recognized by the Illinois foreign language interpreters statute. This statute provides for appointment of an interpreter when a person accused of committing a felony or misdemeanor "is to be tried in any court of this State."" 2 Arguably the prerequisite for implementation of the interpreters statute is not established until after the preliminary hearing. Therefore, the earliest stage in the criminal process when Illinois law recognizes that there may be a need for an interpreter for non-English-speaking defendants is at arraignment. On the other hand, Illinois law does require that both at the bond and preliminary hearings a qualified interpreter must be appointed by the court to interpret the proceedings to a deaf person. 4 3 No challenge has been made to the statute on equal protection grounds as applied to this stage of the criminal process, but it is hard to justify a distinction between the deaf person and the linguistically crippled.
Furthermore, the thrust of the two statutes is markedly different, as is their potential for protecting the defendant's constitutional rights. The statute providing for an interpreter for the deaf makes appointment obligatory, makes clear that the proceedings are to be interpreted to the defendant, and requires a "qualified interpreter of the deaf sign language."a4 The statute for language interpreters in criminal trials provides that the court shall determine upon its own motion or that of counsel whether the accused cannot understand the English language or make himself understood by court, counsel or jury.
4 5 The focus is on the court's ability to take testimony, not the accused's ability to understand the proceedings. The statute Circuit Court Judge Wayne W. Olson, and through the action of Judge Eugene Wachowski, a full-time interpreter of Spanish was appointed to the Cook County Criminal Court Building in Chicago at an annual salary of $11,800 and an interpreter of French, Spanish and Italian was appointed to cover the Cook County Branch courts. These two interpreters were originally responsible for all other branches of the Cook County Crimihal Court. Interview with Judge Wayne Olson, Cook County Criminal Court, Branch 44 (Dec. 2, 1975) .
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 165-11 (1975 
1977]
contains no requirements of competence beyond those implied by the interpreter's oath, 46 which does not apply to testimony not offered to the court. Furthermore, there is no explicit requirement that the proceedings be interpreted to the defendant. Because the procedures for determining need and for determining an interpreter's competence are not spelled out in the foreign language interpreters statute, the trial court has much greater latitude for the exercise of discretion than does the court in applying the interpreters-for-the-deaf statute. As a result, a reviewing court is less likely to find an abuse of discretion.
This deference to the trial court's implied conclusion that the defendant can "speak and understand English" is not unreasonable. Understandably, the reviewing court is hesitant to find error in a meagre record if there is some evidence to support the trial court. The written record is inadequate on the very question raised. Often the reviewing court has only a few isolated words by which to judge, particularly if the defendant has pleaded guilty or has not testified in his own defense. The principle of deference was articulated by the appellate court in People v. Tripp:47 When the witnesses labor under the handicap of language difficulties, an appellate court, which sees only the written record, should pay more than ordinary deference to the conclusions drawn by the trial judge, who observed demeanor and gestures of the witnesses and heard possibly important variables of inflection and emphasis .48
That the court is able to make some sense of what the person said is not determinative of whether the defendant "speaks English" sufficiently well to manage without an interpreter. the defendant claimed the witnesses needed the services of an interpreter. The victim of the assault had had little opportunity to observe and had made an error in identification. Four alibi witnesses. two of sufficient will depend also on the complexity of the issues for trial. Undoubtedly, determination of the sufficiency of the defendant's English should be made by the trial court, but it should be done expressly. The First Circuit in United States v. Carrion 0 endorsed the vesting of broad discretion in the trial court, stressing, however, the consequent obligations on the trial court: (1) to inform the defendant of the right to an interpreter, (2) to appoint an interpreter if the defendant is indigent, and (3) to be alert for such language difficulty during the trial as would require a new determination of need. The First Circuit appeared to require a formal hearing on the question of need or, at least, clear evidence on the record demonstrating the trial court's continuing attention to the defendant's possible need.
5 ' The Illinois courts have not met this standard. If the reviewing courts in Illinois are to continue to defer to the trial court, justice requires that even without a request from counsel, when the trial court has notice of language difficulty it should make some more formal determination of the defendant's ability to speak English before concluding that the statute is satisfied. Without such a formal determiwhom spoke virtually no English, attempted to testify that they had seen the defendant asleep in the living room of his father's apartment at the time of the assault. A review of the abstract of the record reveals a long series of unresponsive or confused answers.
Q nized that in some cases, even a clear record that the defendant has been informed of his right to a jury trial and has signed the jury waiver form may require reversal. The court in that case reversed the conviction of a sixteenyear-old boy, stating that the youth of the boy and seriousness of the crime imposed an extra duty of care on the court to assure that the waiver was made with full knowledge of the consequences. 61 The court would not rely on the defense attorney's assent to the waiver of the jury to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution and its implementing statute 62 for an express, knowing waiver.
The Illinois courts have not provided the same protection of the right by jury to the linguistically infirm. Just as youth places special obligations on the judge to assure that the plea of guilty or jury waiver are understandingly made, so, too, should language disability. Yet in People v. Melero 63 the reviewing court upheld the bench trial conviction when the attorney alone assented to the jury waiver and the trial began:
The Court: Could he go to trial without an interpreter? Mr. Gilbert: He will try to do it. He speaks Spanish. remanded a criminal conviction for wilful failure to support a minor child. The court found that the defendant had not knowingly waived his right to counsel. The trial court had asked Muraviov four perfunctory questions, all of which could be answered by "yes" or "no". The responses had provided the basis for the Appellate Department of the Superior Court to find a sufficient ability in English to sustain the trial judge's action in proceeding without an interpreter. After conducting its own hearing on the accused's ability to speak English, the appeals court concluded:
lit should be obvious that if petitioner was unable to understand or speak English, his monosyllabic "yes" and "no" answers had no meaning.
68
In a similar case, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Landeros v. State 69 reviewed denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The court examined the record of an illiterate MexicanAmerican who had pleaded guilty to murder after having his constitutional rights, including his right to a jury trial, explained to him in English. Although the defendant spoke and understood some English, his use of English was so limited that the court concluded he could not have understandingly waived his constitutional rights. Citing an earlier Oklahoma case," 0 the court recommended appointment of an interpreter when language ability is limited as a "wholesome precautionary measure; and to assure that all of the defendant's waivers were knowingly and intelligently entered."'" Both cases reached the reviewing court with an addition to the bare record of the trial. In Muraviov the habeas proceeding made clear to the court that the defendant could not speak English. In Landeros the record of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty provided similar evidence. These California and Oklahoma cases suggest the constitutional insufficiency of the Illinois courts' position. Illinois courts should require a substantial record demonstrating the defendant's ability to speak and understand English before finding that a waiver is knowing. to have waived Negron's right when the right was previously so ill-defined. 77 The Second Circuit recognized the precedential value of its decision for the defendant who speaks no English. But the decision did little for the defendant who, unlike Negron, speaks some English. The court suggested the parallel of the linguistically incompetent to the mentally incompetent. 78 But it did not explicitly hold, as the Supreme Court had held with respect to mental incompetence in Pate v. Robinson, 79 that when linguistic incompetence is a possibility, the court should hold a hearing sua sponte to determine competence. 0 Negron's linguistic incompetence was "obvious, not just a possibility."'" By neglecting to suggest procedures for determining whether the defendant had a "severe language difficulty,"" 2 the Second Circuit left intact the practice by which a reviewing court would examine the record for hints of the defendant's linguistic competence as a basis for upholding the trial judge's discretionary decision. It was because Negron came to the court on a writ of habeas corpus that the court looked beyond the record. Furthermore, the right to court appointment of an interpreter remained limited to indigent defendants. As the right to an interpreter is now clearly established, the court may presume a waiver of the right if the private attorney does not claim it.
Some of the deficiencies of Negron were overcome in United States v. Carrion 3 where the First Circuit recognized that protection of a defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront witnesses may require an interpreter, even if the defendant has "some ability to understand and communicate" in English:
77 434 F.2d at 390. The court seemed to recognize the danger that an attorney might not assert the right and yet try to carry it on appeal. The obvious cure is for the court on its own motion to hold a hearing on the need. The right to an interpreter rests most fundamentally . . . on the notion that no defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment. Yet how high must the language barrier rise before a defendant has a right to an interpreter? ... Because the determination is likely to hinge upon various factors . . . considerations of judicial economy would dictate that the trial court, coming into direct contact with the defendant, be granted wide discretion in determining whether an interpreter is necessary .... But precisely because the trial court is entrusted with discretion, it should make unmistakably clear to the defendant who may have a language difficulty that he has the right to a court-appointed interpreter if the court determines one is needed, and, whenever put on notice that there may be some significant language difficulty, the court should make such a determination of need.84
The First Circuit suggested that the trial court must weigh the defendant's ability in English together with the complexity of the issues for trial.
"5 In the exercise of its discretion, the trial court has an obligation to hold a formal hearing or to follow other procedures 8 6 to assure that the interpreter will be appointed if needed at any point during the trial. The First Circuit did not suggest that the court's duty to determine need was lessened if the attorney did not ask for an interpreter or the defendant was not indigent. The initiative remained with the court. Even after counsel in Carrion stated that no interpreter was necessary, the trial court had continued to be aware of its responsibility to ensure the defendant understood the testimony.
As early as 1957, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that if the defendant cannot understand the testimony of the witnesses against him because of a language barrier, the defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. In People v. Shok, " the Illinois Supreme Court found an abuse of 84 Id. at 14-15. 85 Id. This court is unique in recognizing the strain of following testimony in another language even if one has some ability to speak it.
86 Id. at 15.
87 12 Ill. 2d 93, 145 N.E.2d 86 (1957) . The fact that the court might glean what the witness meant from the witness's tone of voice and emotions could not compensate for an extensive record revealing the witness's difficulty in expressing herself. discretion in failure to appoint an interpreter for a prosecuting witness who spoke almost no English. The cross-examination had been severely limited by the witness's disability. The record was replete with evidence of the need for a competent interpreter. 8 8 In People v. Starling, 89 it was again the prosecuting witness, and not the defendant who spoke no English. The appointed interpreter's translation was so inadequate that neither the court, counsel nor the defendant could follow the testimony. The interpreter was repeatedly chastised for carrying on an independent colloquy with the defendant. And the abortive crossexamination by defense counsel had to be reshaped to make any sense at all. In Starling, the Illinois appellate court recognized for the first time that:
[T]he due process rights of persons charged with crimes cannot be short-cut by avoiding the ritual of translating each question and answer as required in section 2 of the Act relating to interpreters .9
The reviewing court again had an adequate record from which it could conclude that there had been an abuse of discretion."
88 One could also argue that when a prosecuting witness is so hampered in his or her use of English that there is no way to make the testimony precise, definite and sure, and the testimony is critical to the conviction, then, as a matter of law, the defendant has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
89 21 Ill. App. 3d 217, 315 N.E.2d 163 (1974) . 9 Id. at 222, 315 N.E.2d at 168. 91 In People v. Ortiz, 22 I1. App. 3d 788, 317 N.E.2d 763 (1974) , the defendant argued that his alibi witnesses needed an interpreter. Without one, their answers were "unresponsive and/or contradictory and therefore unconvincing to the court." He was therefore deprived of his right to present his defense. Brief for Appellant at 50-51. Here, despite the clear record of confusion, the appellate court barely acknowledged the argument since the trial court had "understood" the testimony. The issue in testing a witness's testimony should not be whether the witness's answers are decipherable, but whether the witness understood the question and gave responsive answers. The trial court's lack of recognition of the possibility of linguistic isolation during a long period of residency in the United States is revealed by the judge's impatience with the defendant's contention. At the trial the judge commented: "he brought four people up here to testified [sic] falsely. All four of them contradicted each other." Record at 120. At the post conviction hearing the judge said:
They are long term residents of this area. And it [Vol. 68 But the Illinois courts have not yet held that there was an abuse of discretion in any case where the defendant claimed that he had not been afforded his right to confront witnesses because he did not have an interpreter for his own use or because the interpretation granted was deficient.
9 2 The record does not provide any support for his claim that he has not "heard" the testimony, and the Illinois courts appear loath to find an abuse of discretion absent a record of miscomprehension. This is not to suggest the reviewing court need conclude from every incongruous question and answer or from a record containing only monosyllabic responses that there was error in not providing an interpreter. But where the record is inadequate to make any decision on the issue, and the question does not come to the reviewing court in a form where it can determine the defendant's competency through its own hearing, the case should be remanded for an explicit finding. Such a procedure would also prevent manipulation of the record by the defendant who claims he does not speak adequate English and then does not testify in order to preserve his language disability as grounds for later appeal or a writ of habeas corpus. 94 In State v. Aguelara, 9 5 the Missouri trial court in an ex parte hearing weighed the testimony that the defendant spoke Spanish at home and his own claims that he "couldn't get" the questions addressed to him and only knew a few English words sufficient for his job, together with testimony by a friend that she spoke no Spanish but had no difficulty communicating with the defendant. The court concluded that no interpreter was necessary. In upholding the trial court, the is like many times these people, once they didn't get what they want, then they didn't understand what happened. Record at 191.
92 People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d 264, 300 N.E.2d 869 (1973); People v. Martinez, 7 I1. App. 3d 1075 App. 3d , 289 N.E.2d 76 (1972 .
" Since the obligation rests on the court as well as the defendant's counsel, the failure of the defendant's counsel to request an interpreter should not be taken as a waiver if there is an indication of need. But see People v. Melero, 99 Ill. App. 2d 208, 240 N.E.2d 756 (1968) .
" This was the obvious concern of the court in People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d 264, 300 N.E.2d 869 (1973) Missouri Supreme Court stated that in each instance where inability to understand the proceedings was claimed or apparent there must be an express determination of whether an interpreter was necessary before the court will support the decision not to provide an interpreter as a sound exercise of discretion.
'

Quality of Interpretation
The court in People v. Starling 9 e 7 recognized that the quality of interpretation may determine whether the defendant has understood the testimony against him sufficiently to satisfy the constitutional requirement. Similarly, the quality of interpretation may affect whether the defendant has understood and knowingly waived his rights.
The interpreter-for-the-deaf statute provides more assurance that the defendant's constitutional rights will be protected than does the language-interpreter statute. The previous deaf-mute statute explicitly required a "qualified" interpreter;
98 the amended statute requires that the interpreter be a "qualified interpreter of the deaf sign language."9 The Illinois appellate court in Hudson v. Augustine's, Inc."' found that an interpreter who was not formally trained to interpret for the deaf, but instead only knew what the deaf mute had taught him, did not satisfy the statutory requirement of competency. The interpreter had only been able to testify to what he understood the deaf mute to have said, a translation which the court did not find sufficiently "unequivocal and positive and definite in character."' 0 ' The language interpreters statute says nothing about qualifications. Policemen, state employees, and co-defendants are not disqualified solely on the ground that they may be interested parties.1"' The court, in the exercise of its discretion, has used and continues to use relatives and friends or to press court clerical personnel into service.' 0 3 Only one case reviewed revealed an inquiry by the court into the credentials of the interpreter; the burden is on the defendant to show lack of qualification.'" In only a few cases have the Illinois courts found the interpreter incompetent; those involved translation of witnesses' testimony, where the confusion of court and counsel because of the interpreter's incompetence was clear on the record . 115 Any subsequent challenge to the competence of the interpreter when the translation has been made for the benefit of the defendant and not the court suffers from the same disability as that presented when no interpreter is provided.
There is no record of theforeign language interpreta-
tion. Yet behind the questions of competency of the interpreter and the quality of the interpretation lies the question of what the defendant heard and agreed to.
In People v. Rivera, 0 6 the Illinois appellate court found that appointment of a co-defendant as interpreter at the suggestion of the public defender satisfied the requirements of the statute. Any objection to the appointment had been waived by counsel's tender of the inter-103 People v. Rardin, 255 Ill. 9,99 N.E. 59 (1912) . In July, 1974, the author, attending a preliminary hearing for a case handled by the Northwestern University Legal Assistance Clinic, was pressed into service as interpreter for two other cases at the Cook County Criminal Court Building. The same ad hoc procedure was observed during visits to Cook County Court, Municipal Division, Boy's, Gun, and Auto Theft branches, Nov., 1975. The N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, § 1, at 48, col. 3 , reports that at a pretrial hearing to determine whether a prosecutor-obtained interpreter had served as a prosecution informant, a member of the audience was drafted to interpret the proceedings for the Croatian defendant.
Judge Wayne W. Olson complains that without a professional interpreter it is almost impossible to obtain a translation which would make a record of the defendant's comprehension of the proceedings, since the interpreter is inclined to explain rather than translate, when the defendant doesn't understand. Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Cook County Court, Branch 44 (Dec. 1, 1975) .
'0' People v. Martinez, 7 Il1. App. 3d 1075, 289 N.E.2d 76 (1972) .
'o' E.g., People v. Starling, 21111. App. 3d 217, 315 N.E.2d 163 (1974) . In People v. Allen, 22 11. App. 3d 800, 317 N.E.2d 633 (1974) , the interpreter, a friend of the complaining witness, was found dis'qualified as an interested party.
' 13 Il. App. 3d 264, 300 N.E.2d 869 (1973).
preter. The court looked at the careful instructions on jury waiver which the trial court had given to the defendants followed by the question, "He understand that?" and the defendant's answer, "Yes." Despite the absence of any record that the co-defendant had translated the court's words, the reviewing court refused to draw the negative inference that an inadequate translation had taken place.' 0 7 Nor did the court find evidence of incompetence in the codefendant translator's confession to the court that he did not know how to read, but would "tell" the defendant what the jury waiver form said.
08 This is similar to the Illinois court's practice in accepting interpretations which are not literal translations but merely substantially the same as the testimony.' 09 Finally, the court did not question how the co-defendant could provide adequate interpretation once the preliminary proceedings were over and the trial of both defendants was under way.
In People v. Martinez,'" there was no question about the competency of the defense attorney to speak and understand Spanish, but the adequacy of the interpretation which he gave to the defendant was at issue."' The defendant, a 1972) . ' Although the fact that an attorney speaks the language of the accused has led courts to hold that no [Vol. 68 Puerto Rican who neither spoke nor understood English, pleaded guilty to murder and two charges of attempted murder. On appeal he argued that his attorney had tricked him at the trial, taking the time allowed by the judge for translation of thejudge's admonitions to tell him that if he did not plead guilty he would get 100-199 years. The defendant claimed that he believed he was pleading guilty to manslaughter. The court acknowledged that the record carried no indication of the defendant's knowing waiver of his right to a jury trial, but presumed that the attorney, whose ability to translate was established by the trial court, had properly translated the admonitions. Again, because of the absence of any record of the Spanish spoken to the defendant, the record necessary to determine the merits of the appeal was unavailable to the reviewing court. No English-speaking defendant suffers this disability when he asks the court to review the record for evidence of an involuntary plea.
The first solution would be to provide foreign language transcriptions of the interpreter's translation of the proceedings. The transcription could be checked against the English-language proceedings to determine whether sufficient translation was provided so that the defendant could understand the proceedings. One attorney has argued without success that foreign language transcriptions are required by chapter 37, section 163(F)(1) of the Illinois Revised Statutes, which calls for full stenographic notes of the proceedings.1 1 2 The Illinois courts have, however, rejected the contention that the proceedings must be immediately and fully translated to the defendant." 3 An inexpensive and uncomplicated method of preserving the record would be to tape the interpretation for later transcription if necessary, should the competency of the translation be interpreter is necessary, it should be clear that the attorney cannot translate the substance of testimony and properly carry out his functions. But see People v. Martinez, id., 289 N.E.2d 76; cf. People v. Pelgri, 39 Ill. 2d 568, 237 N.E.2d 453 (1968) .
"2 Brief for Appellant at 14, People v. Martinez, 7 I11. App. 3d 1075 App. 3d , 209 N.E.2d 76 (1972 . The court reporter at any arraignment must take full stenographic notes of the proceedings, including the plea by the accused, the receipt and entry by the court, and the admonishment by the court. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 661 (1975 challenged. But there is no precedent in Illinois for even this modest method of assuring that the substance of the proceedings is communicated.
It is no real solution to be able to determine after the trial that the translation was insufficient. Despite the silence of the statute, the trial court is obliged to make an express determination of need if it has notice of language difficulty and to appoint competent interpreters. Neither obligation is relieved by the defense counsel's waiver of an interpreter, tender of an incompetent one, or failure to object to the quality of interpretation. The court should independently determine the competency of the interpreter, unless a professional one is provided by the state. California is almost unique in providing that judges may use examinations or "other suitable means" to assure the competency of interpreters.
1 4 The Illinois Supreme Court or Illinois legislature should implement similar measures.
Employment of a Professional Interpreter
The right to an interpreter to aid the nonEnglish-speaking defendant in protection of his constitutional rights has been more effectively recognized in the federal courts and some other states than in Illinois. The federal courts have moved toward requiring regular procedures to determine need or substantive evidence that the trial judge has in fact made a determination of need whenever language difficulty has developed during a trial. Despite the fact that no standards for interpreters have been promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and no Supreme Court rule makes appointment obligatory, the various district courts of the Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits and of Puerto Rico now employ professional interpreters. Verbatim interpretation is therefore available for the convenience of the court in taking testimony and to translate the proceedings for the indigent defendant.
In the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and in Puerto Mrs. Haas reports that when an interpreter is present at the instigation of prosecutors rather than as an employee of the court, defendants and their attorneys may distrust the interpreter. Interview with Mrs. Haas, Nov. 10, 1976 . The problem in using an interpreter obtained by prosecutors is illustrated in the recent case of Croatian nationalists charged with hijacking a jet. The prosecutions may be jeopardized because the interpreter is charged with also serving as a prosecution informant. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1975, at 48, col. 3. longer be employed for the defendant's use. The defendant may then enlist a member of his family or a friend who is not trained to translate verbatim.
The Illinois decisions do not match those of the federal courts in protecting the non-English-speaking defendant, but the practice which is developing at the Cook County Criminal Court Building may provide even greater advantages than does the federal system. Until May, 1975, the branch courts located at the Cook County Criminal Court Building depended almost entirely on drafting ad hoc interpreters, relatives, clerical and court personnel, when the need arose. A list of interpreters was maintained for more drawn-out procedures, but quality of translation of the proceedings varied.""
The degree to which the need went unrecognized is indicated by the startling increase in the number of cases in which an interpreter has been employed since the judges became aware that the court had hired its first full-time salaried interpreter, skilled in verbatim translation. During the first month, the interpreter was utilized in twenty-four courtroom proceedings. The number of calls for courtroom work increased steadily, so that in the fifth month she made ninety-four courtroom appearances. ' While the Illinois language interpreters statute does not provide for an interpreter at the early stages of the criminal process, the practice at the Criminal Court Building exceeds the requirements of the law. The interpreter arrives at 8:30 A.M. and immediately consults with interviewers to determine which prisoners being held for bond hearings do not speak English. Each morning there are five to eight people in this category. "Before we even get 1"I Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2, 1975 .
"9 Day book of Cook County Criminal Court interpreter, Christina Ruiz, May-Nov. 1975 . Increasingly, the judges at the Cook County Criminal Court Building take precautionary measures when there is some doubt of the ability of the defendant to comprehend. One judge who formerly had been quick to conclude no interpreter was necessary now accounts for a substantial portion of the interpreter's caseload. Interview with Christina Ruiz, Dec. 2, 1975 . Anotherjudge stated that there was no doubt that the court, knowing that the interpreter is available, can now explore more carefully with the defendant his understanding of the pleading, waivers, and testimony. Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2, 1975. [Vol. 68
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started in the morning [the interpreter] has spotted the cases where she will be needed , ' "120 one judge told an interviewer. The interpreter, appearing at the bond hearings, is able to have her schedule considered when later proceedings are being scheduled. When there are delays or continuances, the defendant does not find himself without an interpreter. If the need is not immediately apparent but becomes clear during the trial, the interpreter can be present after only a brief recess.' 2 '
Once the need for an interpreter is established, interpreter's services are provided at state expense. The availability of a professional interpreter means that the judges at the Cook County Criminal Court Building can recommend her services even when the defendant retains a private attorney. Although private counsel do not yet take proper advantage of the availability of a free interpreter, some judges regularly offer conference time for the private attorney to consult with his client through the interpreter.
22
In the past there have been almost no standards for interpretation of courtroom proceedings to the non-English-speaking defendant unless and until he testifies. Even then the standards have varied widely. But with the introduction of a professional interpreter translating verbatim, the quality of the defendant's understanding becomes a part of the record. When there is confusion, when the defendant has not understood the court's admonitions, there is no longer a colloquy of explanation in the foreign language between the defendant and the interpreter. The defendant's questions are translated to the court and the court's further ex-120 Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2, 1975. 121 Personal observations of the author during a half day spent with Criminal Court interpreter, Christina Ruiz, Cook County Criminal Court, Dec. 2, 1975. In the first year of the program, the single interpreter was also on call to all branch courts, but she could not meet these demands and also meet the mass need at the central criminal court. A second interpreter now serves the southern branch courts. Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Nov. 12, 1976. 122 Public defenders also have a greater opportunity to prepare their cases involving non-Englishspeaking defendants. planation provided to the defendant through the interpreter.'" Furthermore, when English-speaking witnesses, counsel or the court speak, the court can be confident that the proceedings are being translated. The interpreter has the powers of intense concentration necessary for interpretation and no other duties to distract from that obligation. A professional interpreter also can master the subtleties of dialect 1 2 4 and the specialized language of such fields as medical pathology. Moreover, the interpretation is not obtrusive.
For the defendant whose bond hearing is held elsewhere in Cook County or whose alleged criminal act carries him into some other courtroom in the state, the need for interpretation of the proceedings to the defendant continues to be ignored or inadequately met except when provided by conscientious counsel. Even at the Cook County Criminal Court Building, needs in languages other than Spanish are met in a more makeshift manner. And some judges still prefer to avoid using an interpreter's services unless the need is glaring.
2 Thus, protection of the defendant's rights is still somewhat arbitrary.
CONCLUSION
While recognizing that failure to provide an interpreter might violate a defendant's constitutional rights to a jury trial or confrontation of witnesses, the Illinois appellate court continues to give such deference to the trial court's discretion in cases where the defendant speaks little English that appeal is discouraging. The court's failure to insist on an adequate record of the defendant's comprehension of the proceedings to support the trial court's decision not to ' See People v. Starling, 21 111. App. 3d 217, 221 N.E.2d 163 (1974) .Judge Olson reported that this was one of the most recurring and frustrating problems in that he could not know if the explanation contained the substance of the court's words. Interview with Judge Wayne W. Olson, Dec. 2, 1975. '24 In People v. Starling, 21 Ill. App. 3d 217, 221 N.E.2d 163 the question whether the Spanish-speaking witness had been in a bar was misunderstood when the bailiff-interpreter apparently translated the word as "bara," a Caribbean usage. The witness denied being in the "bara." In Mexico the word is "cantina." Brief for Appellant at 15.
'
Interview with Criminal Court interpreter Chritina Ruiz, Dec. 2, 1975. One judge has not used the interpreter at all.
provide an interpreter means that appointment of any interpreter is often a matter of chance. Furthermore, even in those cases where an interpreter is used, since no provision is made for appointment of professional interpreters or for transcribing or recording the interpretation given, the trial record often reveals almost nothing of what an interpreter has in fact communicated to the defendant or whether the defendant has understood.
A hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, if appropriate and timely, or a petition on a writ of habeas corpus may be the only ways that such a defendant can create an independent record of his disability. It may even be more difficult to establish the incompetence of an interpreter who has translated nothing for the record.'
26 Until the Supreme Court of Illinois or the Illinois legislature establishes clear procedures and standards to determine need and quality of interpretation, the non-Englishspeaking defendant's rights to trial by jury, to effective counsel, to confront adverse witnesses and to a fundamentally fair trial are not assured.
